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Abstract
This paper employs a nation-wide sample of supermarket scanner data to estimate a large brand-level
demand system for beer in the U.S. using the Distance Metric method of Pinkse, Slade and Brett [Pinkse, J.,
Slade, M., Brett, C., 2002. Spatial price competition: a semiparametric approach. Econometrica 70, 1111–
1155]. Unlike previous studies, this work estimates the own- and cross-advertising elasticities in addition to
price elasticities. Positive and negative cross-advertising elasticities imply the presence of both cooperative
and predatory effects of advertising expenditures across brands; however, the former effect appears to
dominate suggesting that advertising increases the overall demand for beer. We discuss the implications of
these results in this industry.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: D12; L66; M37
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1. Introduction
Empirical analyses of issues in differentiated products markets often require the estimation of
numerous demand elasticities. Some applications of price elasticity estimates include the delineation of
markets, market power assessment, and the competitive effects of mergers. While brand-level adver-
tising elasticities are less commonly estimated, they can be used to determine whether advertising is
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predatory (it rearranges market shares) or cooperative (it shifts demand out). Determining the nature of
advertising in the U.S. brewing industry is of particular interest because previous policy decisions on
whether to allow advertising of alcoholic beverages have assumed that advertising is purely predatory.1
Estimating brand-level own- and cross-elasticities for many differentiated products is a difficult
task due to the large number of unknown parameters to be estimated. A common approach used to
address this dimensionality problem is to place restrictions on the cross-price coefficients. For
example, neoclassical demand models, such as those used by Hausman et al. (1994), and Hausman
(1996) rely on the assumption of weak separability to reduce the number of independent cross-price
coefficients. The drawback with this ‘multistage’ approach is that the elasticity estimates are
dependent on the assumed separable structure of the utility function, which is difficult to test
empirically. Aggregate versions of the discrete choice (DC) demand model reduce the number of
coefficients by projecting the number of products on to a lower dimensional space, namely the
product characteristics. Variants of the DC model are attractive because they explicitly model
consumers' heterogeneity of preferences over product characteristics. The main drawbacks DC
models are the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property in logit and nested logitmodels,
the computational complexity of the random coefficients model, and the assumption that the
consumer purchases a single unit of the differentiated product. This last assumption clearly does not
fit consumer behavior in many differentiated product markets.
Pinkse et al. (2002) [henceforth PSB] developed the distance metric (DM) technique to
overcome the dimensionality limitation of neoclassical demand models by specifying the cross-
price terms as a function of a brand's location in product characteristic space relative to other
brands. Various distance measures between brands may be constructed and used as weights to
create cross-price indices for each distance measure. The cross-price coefficients and elasticities
can then be computed using the estimated coefficients for the cross-price indices and the distance
measures between brands. The advantages of the DM method are that it is easier to estimate than
the random coefficient DC model; it allows testing the existence and strength of different product
groupings as potential sources of competition; and it accounts for the location of brands location
in product space.
In this paper, we employ the DM method to estimate the price and advertising elasticities of
demand for 64 brands of beer in the United States. This is one of the first studies that estimates a
large number of brand-level advertising elasticities.2 In addition, controlling for brand advertising
is important because it reduces the likelihood of common demand shocks across regions, which
improves the validity of our identifying assumption for prices.
While our estimated price elasticities are consistent with previous work, the estimated
advertising elasticities convey new results. Positive and negative cross-advertising elasticities
imply the presence of both cooperative and predatory effects. However, the former effect
dominates suggesting that advertising increases the overall demand for beer. This is an important
result in the long debate about the effects of advertising on alcohol consumption.
2. Empirical model
Previous DM applications (Pinkse and Slade, 2004; Slade, 2004) employ a quadratic indirect
utility function and use Roy's Identity to derive the uncompensated demand functions. If the
1 SeeElzinga (2000),Nelson (2005) andTremblay andTremblay (2005) for detailed descriptions of theU.S. brewing industry.
2 Advertising in differentiated products has been investigated in markets with fewer brands. For example, Deighton,
Henderson and Neslin (1994) study markets with less than 10 brands.
marginal utility of income is constant, which may be plausible when using cross-sectional or very
short panel data, its value may be normalized to equal one, greatly simplifying the demand
functions to be estimated. Because of the length of panel data we employ, 20 quarters, it is less
plausible that the marginal utility of income is constant. Thus, the quadratic indirect utility
function is less attractive because the uncompensated demand functions are non-linear in the
parameters. Given the large number of brands, estimating a model that incorporates the DM
method and is non-linear in the parameters is not practical. To solve this problem, we employ a
linear approximation of the Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980):
wjt ¼ ajt⁎þ
Xn
k¼1
bjk log pkt þ dj logðxt=PtÞ ð1Þ
The t={1,…, T} subscript denotes the market, which is defined as a city-quarter pair in this study,
wjt=pjt qjt /xt is brand j's sales share in market t, pjt is the price of brand j in market t, qjt is the
quantity purchased of brand j in market t, xt ¼ Pnj¼1 pjtqjt is the level of total expenditures in market
t, andPt is the price index inmarket t. Because the Stone price index is not invariant to changes in the
units of measurement (Moschini, 1995) we specify a log-linear analogue of the Laspeyeres price
index (PL) to linearize the ALIDS. This index is defined as: log PLt ¼ Pnj¼1 woj logð pjtÞ; where wjo is
base share for brand j, which is defined aswoj ¼ T−1PTt¼1 wjt.
Following Sutton (1991: 45–16) advertising is assumed to be persuasive rather than informative.
We focus on traditional advertising (e.g. television, radio and press), rather than on local promotional
activity (e.g. local paper, in-store promotions, and end-of-aisle product location), as the key advertising
variable because it has played a crucial role in the development and research of the industry. Also,
traditional advertising is more apt to be independent of the pricing strategy, since brewers' mass media
advertising seldom informs consumers about price. Only the flow effects of advertising are included
because in alternative model specifications with lagged advertising expenditures the estimated
coefficients for lagged advertising expenditure were not statistically different than zero.
Advertising is incorporated into Eq. (1) through the intercept term ajt⁎, which is modified to equal:
ajt⁎ ¼ ajt þPnk¼1 cjkAgkt; where Akt represents advertising expenditures of brand k in market t.3 The
parameter γ is included to account for decreasing returns to advertising. Following Gasmi et al.
(1992), γ is set equal to 0.5. The constant term ajt incorporates time, city and brand binary variables
as well as product characteristics and other market specific variables (e.g. demographics).
Substituting this definition of ajt⁎ into Eq. (1) and adding an error term:
wjt ¼ ajt þ
Xn
k¼1
bjk log pkt þ
Xn
k¼1
cjk A
g
kt þ dj logðxt=PLt Þ þ ejt: ð2Þ
Eq. (2) can be interpreted as a first-order approximation in prices and advertising to the
demand function that allows for unrestricted price and advertising parameters. With 64 brands, it
would be impractical to estimate Eq. (2) without reducing the dimensionality of the model.
2.1. The distance metric (DM) method
The cross-price and cross-advertising coefficients (bjk and cjk) in Eq. (2) are specified as
functions of different distance measures between brands j and k. These distance measures may
be either continuous or discrete. For example, the alcohol content of a brand may be used to
3 A logarithmic specification for advertising is not possible due to zero entries for some brands.
construct a continuous distance measure. Dichotomous variables that identify brands by product
segment, such as light beer or premium beer, can be used to construct a discrete distance
measure. The continuous distance measures use an inverse measure of Euclidean distance, or
closeness, in product space between brands j and k.4 This measure of closeness varies between
zero and one, with a value of one if both brands are located at the same location in product space.
The discrete distance measures take the value of 1 if j and k belong to the same grouping and
zero otherwise.
Following PSB, we define the cross-price and cross-advertising coefficients as: bjk=g(δjk) and
cjk=h(μjk), where δjk and μjk are the set of distance measures for price and advertising,
respectively.5 Then, Eq. (2) can be written as:
wjt ¼ ajt þ bjj log pjt þ cjj Agjt þ
Xn
k p j
gðdjkÞlog pkt þ
Xn
k p j
hðljkÞAgkt þ dj log ðxt=PLt Þ þ ejt:
ð3Þ
The functions g and h measure how the strength of competition between brands varies with
distance measures and are specified as a linear combination of the distance measures:6
g ¼
XL
l¼1
kld
l
jk ; and ð4Þ
h ¼
XM
m¼1
sml
m
jk ð5Þ
where λ and τ are coefficients to be estimated, and L and M are the number of distance measures
for price and advertising, respectively. Because the distance measures are symmetric by definition
(δjk=δkj and μjk=μkj), symmetry may be imposed by setting λ and τ to be equal across equations.
This implies that bjk=bkj and cjk=ckj. The cross-price and cross-advertising coefficients (bjk, cjk)
and elasticities are then recovered from the estimates of λ and τ, and the distance measures.
In principle, (n−1) equations can be estimated. However, if n is very large, then it may become
impractical to estimate a large system of equations. One method to further reduce the
dimensionality of the estimation procedure is to assume that the own-price and own-advertising
coefficients (bjj and cjj), as well as the coefficient on real expenditures (dj), are constant across
equations thereby reducing estimation to a single equation. Since this assumption is too
restrictive, following Pinkse and Slade, the coefficients bjj, cjj, and dj are specified as functions of
each brand's product characteristics. For example, using alcohol content as the only product
characteristic, the own-price coefficient in Eq. (3) would be defined as bjj=b1+b2ALCj, where
ALCj is brand j's alcohol content (effectively interacting price with characteristics).
4 Closeness between brands j and k is defined as: 1 / [1+2⁎ (Euclidean distance between j and k)]. The main results are
not sensitive to alternative definitions of closeness.
5 For simplicity, distance measures (δjk, μjk) are depicted as market invariant.
6 As shown by PSB, a parametric specification may not always be consistent. Semi-parametric specifications of g and
h indicated that the parametric version is not restrictive (see Rojas, 2005).
Combining Eqs. (3), (4), and (5) with the own-price and own-advertising interactions
described above and after regrouping prices into L weighted terms and cross-advertising into M
weighted terms, the empirical model is written as:
wjt ¼ ajt þ b1 log pjt þ
XG
g¼1
bgþ1 log pjt PC
p
gt þ c1Agjt þ
XH
h¼1
chþ1A
g
jt PC
A
ht þ
þ
XL
l¼1
kl
Xn
k p j
dljk log pkt
!
þ
XM
m¼1
sm
Xn
k p j
lmjk A
g
kt
!
þ dj logðxt=PLt Þ þ ejt
ð6Þ
where PCgt
p is the gth characteristic of product j interacted with the own-price, and PCht
A is the hth
characteristic of product j interacted with own-advertising.
Note that the number of independent parameters for cross-price terms has been reduced from
n(n−1) / 2 to L. Similarly, the number of independent cross-advertising parameters has been
reduced from n(n−1) / 2 to M. In the analysis that follows, each cross-price and cross-
advertising distance measure in each market is depicted as a (n×n) “weighing” matrix with
element ( j,k) equal to the distance between brands j and k when j≠ k, and zero otherwise. Thus,
when the (n×n) weighing matrix is multiplied by the (n×1) vector of brand prices or advertising
in each market one obtains the appropriate sum over k≠ j in the share equation.
2.2. Continuous distance measures
Three continuous product characteristics are utilized in this study: alcohol content (ALC), product
coverage (COV), and container size (SIZE).7 Product coverage measures the fraction of the market
that is covered by a brand. Beers with low coverage may be interpreted as specialty brands that are
targeted to a particular segment of the population. Beer is sold in a variety of sizes (e.g., six and twelve
packs), and the variable SIZEmeasures the average package “size” of a brand. Higher volume brands
(e.g., typical sales of twelve packs and cases) may compete less strongly with brands that are sold in
smaller packages (e.g., six packs). The distance measures are computed in one- and two-dimensional
Euclidean space and stored in “weighing” matrices (W ) where the j,k entry in each matrix
corresponds to the distance measure between brands j and k. The one-dimensional matrices are
denotedWALC,WCOV, andWSIZE and the two-dimensionalmatrices are denotedWAC,WAS, and
WCS, where A,C, and S stand for alcohol content, product coverage and container size, respectively.
2.3. Discrete distance measures
Three different types of product grouping discrete distance measures are utilized: product
segment, brewer identity, and national brand identity. Previous studies on beer have considered
several different product segment classifications. With no clear consensus on product segment
classifications we consider five different classifications: (1) budget, light, premium, super-
premium, and imports, (2) light and regular, (3) budget, light, and premium, (4) domestic and
import, and (5) budget, premium, super-premium, and imports. The weighing matrices for the
product segment, denotedWPROD1 throughWPROD5, are constructed such that element ( j,k) is
equal to one if brands j and k belong to the same product segment and zero otherwise.
A discrete distance measure for brewer identity is utilized to allow the model to determine if
consumers are more apt to substitute between brands of the same firm when there are price
7 Limited information on product characteristics restricts the number of continuous measures.
changes, and if there are predatory, or cooperative, effects in advertising among beers produced
by the same brewer. The weighting matrix WBREW is constructed such that element ( j,k) is equal
to one if brands j and k are produced by the same brewer and zero otherwise.
Because not all brands are sold in all city markets, the last product grouping classifies brands
by whether they are regional or national brands. This distance measure is used to test whether
brands that are national (regional) compete more strongly with each other. The weighting matrix
WREG takes a value of one if brands j and k are both regional or both national, and zero
otherwise. All weighing matrices constructed from product groupings are normalized so that the
sum of each row is equal to one. This normalization allows the weighted prices and advertising
expenditures of rival brands that are in the same grouping to equal their average.
Following PSB, two other types of discrete measures are constructed based on whether two brands
are their nearest neighbor (NN) in product space and if products share a common boundary (CB) in
product space. Brands j and k share a common boundary if there is a set of points in product space that
are at an equal distance from both brands and no other brand is closer to these points. (SeeRojas (2005)
for more details.) The nearest neighbor (NN) and common boundary (CB) measures are computed for
all brands based on their location in alcohol content and coverage space (weighing matrices WNNAC
andWCBAC) and coverage and container size space (weighingmatricesWNNCS andWCBCS). The
j,k element of these weighing matrices is equal to one if brands j and k share a common boundary
(WCBAC and WCBCS) or are each other's nearest neighbor (WNNAC and WNNCS) and zero
otherwise.
Because the continuous product characteristics alcohol content (ALC), product coverage (COV),
and container size (SIZE) have different units of measurement, their values are rescaled before
computing the weighing matrices. To restrict the product space for each of these characteristics to
values between 0 and 1, each continuous product characteristic is divided by its maximum value.
Restricting the product space in this manner eased the calculation of the common boundaries. Without
this restriction, common boundaries of brands located on the periphery of the product space are difficult
to define.
In addition to using product characteristics, a second set of nearest neighbor and common
boundary measures are computed using product characteristics and price. Including price to
calculate the nearest neighbor and common boundary measures allows consumers' brand choices
to be influenced by both the distance in characteristics space and in price. For this case, nearest
neighbors and common boundaries are identified based on the square of the Euclidean distance
between brands plus a price differential between brands.
2.4. Own-price and own-advertising interactions
Two product characteristics are interacted with own-price and own-advertising in the model:
the inverse of product coverage (1 /COV) and the number of common boundary neighbors
(NCB). The number of common boundary neighbors is a measure of local competition that
determines the number of competitors that are closely located to a brand in product space. NCB is
computed in product coverage-container size space and alcohol content-coverage space.
3. Data
Table 1 provides a description and summary statistics for all variables. The main data
source is the Information Resources Inc. (IRI) Infoscan Database. The IRI data includes
prices and total sales for several hundred brands for up to 58 metropolitan areas (henceforth
called ‘cities’ for simplicity) over 20 quarters (1988–1992). Volume sales (Q) in each city
are reported as the number of 288-ounce units sold each quarter by all supermarkets in that
city area and price is an average price for a volume of 288 oz for each brand. To maintain
focus on brands with significant market share, all brands with a local market share of less
than 3% are excluded from the sample. Using this selection criterion, 64 different brands
produced by 13 different brewers are included in the sample (Table 2). On average there are
37 brands sold in each city market with a minimum of 24 brands and a maximum of 48
brands.
In addition to price and sales data, the IRI database contains information on several brand
specific and market variables. The variable UNITS provides the number of units, regardless of
size, sold each quarter. These data are used to create an average size variable defined as SIZE=Q /
UNITS. The variable COV (Coverage) measures the market coverage for each brand and is
defined as the sum of all commodity value (ACV) sold by stores carrying the product divided by
the ACV of all stores in the city.
Advertising data (A) was obtained from the Leading National Advertising annual publication.
These are quarterly data by brand comprising total national advertising expenditures for 10 media
types. Alcohol content (ALC) was collected from various specialized sources (especially Case et
al., 2000). It is assumed that alcohol content remains constant for each brand.8 The binary variable
Table 1
Description and summary of statistics of variables
Variable Description Units Mean Standard
deviation
Min Max
IRI database
Price Average (per brand) price $/288 oz 12.1 3.87 0.82 28.9
Quantity Volume sold 288 oz (000) 23.53 63.6 0.00 2652
UNITS Number of units sold, regardless of size (000) 57.88 149.9 28.1 6111
COV Sum of all commodity value (ACV) sold by stores
carrying the product/ACV of all stores in the city
% 74.0 28.61 0.26 100
Other variables
A Quarterly national advertising expenditures Mill of $ 3.54 6.3 0 40.3
SIZE Quantity/UNITS N/A 0.38 0.117 0.07 1.30
ALC Alcohol Content %/vol 4.48 0.94 0.4 5.25
REG 1 if brand is regional, 0 otherwise 0/1 0.15 – – –
Budget 1 if brand is budget, 0 otherwise 0/1 0.37 – – –
Light 1 if brand is light, 0 otherwise 0/1 0.235 – – –
Premium 1 if brand is premium, 0 otherwise 0/1 0.185 – – –
Spremium 1 if brand is super-premium, 0 otherwise 0/1 0.10 – – –
Import 1 if brand is import, 0 otherwise 0/1 0.10 – – –
WAGES Average wage of worker in retail sector $/h 7.3 1.17 3.58 12.3
DEN Population per square mile (000) 4.73 4.13 0.73 23.7
Source: IRI database, University of Connecticut; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Demographia; other sources.
8 Some states limit alcohol content (e.g. Oklahoma). In these cases, the alcohol content variable is a less accurate proxy
for actual alcohol content. City dummies moderate this problem.
(REG) takes a value of one if brand j is a regional brand and zero if it is a national brand. A brand
is defined as regional if it is only present in a few contiguous states.
4. Estimating the demand model
Given the strategic nature of price and advertising, all terms in Eq. (6) that contain these two
variables are treated as endogenous. An instrumental variables approach is used to consistently
estimate the model parameters.
Let nz be the number of instruments, Z the (T×n)×nz matrix of instruments, S the collection of
right hand side variables in Eq. (6) and θ the vector of parameters to be estimated. The
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is used:
hˆGMM ¼ ðS VPzSÞ−1S VPzPw;
Table 2
Selected brands by brewer (acronym and country of origin)
Brewer Brand Brewer Brand
Anheuser–Busch: (AB, U.S.) Budweiser Grupo Modelo: Corona
Bud Dry (GM, Mexico)
Bud Light Goya (GO, U.S.): Goya
Busch Heineken: Heineken
Busch Light (H, Netherlands)
Michelob Labatt: Labatt
Michelob Dry (LB, Canada) Labatt Blue
Michelob Golden Draft Rolling Rock
Michelob Light Molson: Molson
Natural Light (M, Canada) Molson Golden
Odoul's Old Vienna
Adolph Coors: (ADC, U.S.) Coors Pabst: Falstaff
Coors Extra Gold (P, U.S.) Hamms
Coors Light Hamms Light
Keystone Olympia
Keystone Light Pabst Blue Ribbon
Bond Corp a: (B, U.S.) Black Label Red White and Blue
Blatz Miller/Phillip Morris: Genuine Draft
Heidelberg (PM, U.S.) Meister Brau
Henry Weinhard Ale Meister Brau Light
Henry Weinhard P. R. MGD Light
Kingsbury Miller High Life
Lone Star Miller Lite
Lone Star Light Milwaukee's Best
Old Style Stroh: Goebel
Old Style Light (S, U.S.) Old Milwaukee
Rainier Old Milwaukee Light
Schmidts Piels
Sterling Schaefer
Weidemann Schlitz
White Stag Stroh
Genesee: (GE, U.S.) Genesee FX Matts: Matts
Kochs (W, U.S.) Utica Club
aThese brands correspond to G. Hieleman Brewing Co., which was acquired in 1987 by Australian Bond Corporation
Holdings; it is classified as a domestic brewer because this foreign ownership was temporary.
with consistent estimator for its asymptotic variance, A var (θˆGMM)= (S′Pz S )
−1; where, Pz=
Z(Z′ΩˆZ )−1Z′, and Ωˆ is a (T×n) × (T×n) “weighing” matrix.
The GMM estimator can accommodate and correct for the presence of heteroskedasticity
and correlation of unknown form through elements of the weighing matrix. The off-diagonal
element j,k is defined as: Ωˆj,k= εˆjεˆk if the pair of observations ( j,k) are suspected to be
correlated, and zero otherwise. The diagonal elements are defined as εˆj
2 to incorporate
heteroskedasticity. Note that εˆ is the residual obtained from a ‘first step’ 2-stage least squares
regression. We accommodate for the presence of temporal (one lag) and spatial (across cities
and across brands) correlation.9
4.1. Instruments
Two different identification assumptions are utilized: after controlling for brand, city, and time
specific effects, demand shocks are independent across cities and across time. We employ both
assumptions to address price endogeneity and the second to address the endogeneity of
advertising and product coverage.
Because beer is produced in large-scale plants and then distributed to various markets, the
price of a given brand will be correlated across markets due to a common marginal cost. If the
demand shocks are independent across cities, prices will not be correlated with demand shocks
in other markets and can hence be used as instruments for other markets. A potential problem in
using prices in other cities as instruments is that beer is costly to transport. This could result
in poor correlation between prices in a city that is distant to the nearest brewing facility and prices
in cities that are more closely located to a brewing facility. This appears not to be the case in our
data for two reasons. First, the brewers included in our sample have multiple plants located
throughout the United States. Second, we tested for the possibility of this “transportation cost”
effect by including an instrumental variable for price that measures a brand's distance from its
nearest plant. The coefficient on this distance variable in the first stage regression of price on all
included and excluded instruments was statistically insignificant, suggesting that, after
controlling for other factors, transportation costs are not an important price determinant.
The inclusion of national advertising expenditures and time dummy variables further
reduces the potential that demand shocks may be correlated across markets. The inclusion of
advertising expenditures controls for advertising related demand shocks that may be
correlated across markets. The inclusion of time dummy variables controls for any other
unobserved national demand shock. In addition, we include brand dummies to control for
unobserved product characteristics that are invariant across markets (e.g. brand loyalty,
status) and are likely to be correlated with the error term (Berry, 1994; Nevo, 2001). Finally,
the IRI data employed in this study is based on broadly defined city/regional markets which
further reduce the possibility of potential correlation between the unobserved shocks across
markets.
To assess the robustness of our results, we first utilize the identifying assumption of
independence of demand across markets and then the assumption of independence of demand
across time (using lagged prices as instruments). We also conduct a test of instrument exogeneity
that is valid in the presence of temporal and spatial correlation and particularly suitable for this
application where price enters the demand equation in several variables (interacted and weighted
9 Tests on estimates of the error term (i.e. residuals) from GMM estimation without this correction suggested the
presence of temporal and spatial error correlation.
terms). The test, developed by PSB (see Pinske and Slade: p. 627–628), is similar to a GMM
differential test in which the error-orthogonality of a subset of “suspicious” instruments is tested.
In this application we conduct two instrument exogeneity tests: one in which the suspicious
instruments are those constructed with lagged price and the non-suspicious instruments are those
constructed with average price in other cities, and another in which suspicious instruments are
those constructed with average price in other cities and the non-suspicious instruments are those
constructed with lagged price.
Following Nevo (2001), we also create proxies for city-specific marginal costs that are used as
additional price instruments to conduct overidentifying tests. The proxies utilized are city density
(DEN) for the cost of shelf space and average wage in the retail sector (WAGE) for supermarket
labor costs.
Because national brand-level advertising expenditures are invariant across markets, we utilize
the second identifying assumption and use lagged advertising expenditures as instruments for
advertising. Since expenditures, (xt), are constructed with price and quantity variables, this term is
also treated as endogenous and instrumented with median income (INC).
A final identification assumption, which is common practice in the literature, is that product
characteristics are assumed to be mean independent of the error term. However, a brewer that
advertises more might have a larger product coverage and if advertising is correlated with the
error term, then coverage should not be treated as an exogenous variable. We instrument coverage
using its lagged value. Coverage in neighboring cities was also considered as an instrument but it
turned out to be a very poor one.
5. Results
Given the large number of possible distance measures and high levels of collinearity between
these measures, preliminary OLS regressions are used to determine the most relevant continuous
and discrete product spaces for cross-price and cross-advertising terms. Each OLS regression is a
restricted version of Eq. (6) in which either one cross-price term or one cross-advertising term is
specified. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and t-statistics on the weighted cross-term
using each of the distance measures.
First, one- and two-dimensional continuous distance measures for alcohol content, product
coverage, and container size were used to weigh rival prices and rival advertising. Results for the
one-dimensional distance measures indicate that closeness in alcohol content and product
coverage is important for weighting rival prices while closeness in product coverage and
container size is important for weighting rival advertising expenditures. Results for the two-
dimensional distance measures indicate that closeness in alcohol content-product coverage and
product coverage-container size space are important for both rival prices and advertising. Because
using the same product space for both rival prices and advertising causes the weighted rival prices
and advertising to be highly collinear, alcohol content-product coverage is assumed to be the
relevant product space for weighing rival prices and product coverage-container size is assumed
to be the relevant product space for advertising. Switching the relevant product spaces, alcohol
content-product coverage for advertising and product coverage-container size for price, did not
lead to changes in our main results.
Using these relevant continuous product spaces, we next consider similar OLS regressions
with common boundary and nearest neighbor distance measures. For rival prices, the common
boundary measure that includes price and the nearest neighbor measure without price perform
better than their counterparts. For rival advertising, the distinction between including or not
including price in common boundary and nearest neighbor distance measures is not clear. The t-
statistics for the measures without price are slightly larger than their counterparts.
The last set of regressions focus on discrete measures constructed from product groupings. The
positive coefficient on rival prices and the negative coefficient on rival advertising weighted by
brewer identity indicate that consumers are more apt to substitute between brands of the same
firm. The positive coefficient on rival prices weighted by WREG indicates closer rivalry among
regional brands. However, the positive coefficient on rival advertising weighted by WREG
suggests the existence of cooperative effects of advertising among regional brands.
Because brands that belong to the same product segment should be substitutes, the estimated
coefficient on rival prices weighted by product segment should be positive. The only positive
coefficient that is statistically significant for rival prices is that of product classification 2
Table 3
Estimated coefficient on weighted prices and weighted advertising from separate OLS regressions a
Distance measure (weighing matrix acronym) Rival price b Rival advertising
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
Continuous distance measures
One-dimensional
Alcohol content (WALC) 1.42⁎⁎ 2.39 0.02 0.44
Product coverage (WCOV) 7.65⁎ 41.02 0.43⁎ 57.56
Container size (WSIZE) 0.23 0.74 0.21⁎ 11.37
Two-dimensional
Alcohol content−product coverage (WAC) 10.84⁎ 27.30 0.78⁎ 43.22
Alcohol content−container size (WAS) 1.28⁎⁎ 2.42 0.17⁎ 4.93
Product coverage−container size (WCS) 8.28⁎ 30.51 0.58⁎ 49.79
Discrete distance measures
Common boundary (CB)
Alcohol content−product coverage (WCBAC) 0.83⁎⁎ 2.08
Alcohol content−product coverage−price (WCBACP) 5.20⁎ 12.10
Product coverage−container size (WCBCS) 0.38⁎ 32.70
Product coverage−container size – price (WCBCSP) 0.53⁎ 25.05
Nearest neighbor (NN)
Alcohol content – product coverage (WNNAC) 11.19⁎ 20.68
Alcohol content−product coverage−price (WNNACP) 2.60⁎ 4.73
Product coverage−container size (WNNCS) 0.50⁎ 25.21
Product coverage−container size−price (WNNCSP) 0.39⁎ 14.77
Product groupings
National Identity (WREG) 62.59⁎ 4.49 0.92⁎⁎⁎ 1.70
Brewer identity (WBREW) 29.28⁎ 6.41 −0.29⁎⁎ −2.12
Product classification 1 c (WPROD1) −2.07 −0.17 −1.08⁎ −7.84
Product classification 2 (WPROD2) 116.70⁎ 7.51 −1.89⁎ −7.46
Product classification 3 (WPROD3) 19.36 0.56 −2.88⁎ −13.66
Product classification 4 (WPROD4) −82.75⁎ −4.87 −2.03⁎ −4.42
Product classification 5 (WPROD5) −42.85⁎⁎ −2.35 −0.31⁎⁎ −1.96
⁎ Significant at 1%, ⁎⁎ significant at 5%, ⁎⁎⁎ significant at 10%.
a Each coefficient (and its t-statistic) is obtained from a separate OLS regression of Eq. (6) in which the coefficient
displayed in each cell above corresponds to the only weighted rival term included (i.e. either weighted rival price or
weighted rival advertising). All regressions include city, brand, and time binary variables.
b Coefficients have been multiplied by 10,000 for readability.
c Product classifications are: (1) budget, light, premium, super-premium, and imports; (2) light and regular; (3) budget,
light, and premium; (4) domestic and import; and (5) budget, premium, super-premium, and imports.
(WPROD2): light and regular beers. For rival advertising, the coefficients on all product segments
are negative. The largest and most significant coefficient is that of product classification 3
(WPROD3). This classification is similar to 2 except that it includes the “budget” category in
addition to light and regular.
5.1. Brand share equation
Results from OLS regressions in Table 3 were used to guide the choice of the variables that
enter our final specification. However, when pooled into a single regression, some distance
measures were highly collinear. Rival prices weighted by alcohol content-product coverage
(WAC) and rival advertising expenditures weighted by product coverage-container size (WCS)
were highly collinear. Weighing rival advertising expenditures by container size only (WSIZE)
reduced this problem while not affecting the other parameter estimates. The common boundary
distance measure in alcohol content-product coverage-price space (WCBACP) is highly collinear
with other distance measures for rival prices and is omitted.
Table 4 reports the estimates of two OLS and four GMM regressions using the final choice of
variables. In all models considered, the estimated coefficient for rival advertising expenditures
weighted by brewer identity (WBREW) is not statistically significant than zero and its value is not
reported in Table 4. Product classification 2 (WPROD2) is used to weight rival prices while
product classification 3 (WPROD3) is used to weight rival advertising expenditures because this
specification had the highest explanatory power. Model specifications that used the same product
classification for weighing rival price and advertising were also considered but did not yield
significant changes in the estimated parameters.
The results for the six different models in Table 4 track the effect of different endogeneity
controls on the magnitude and significance of coefficients. The difference between the first and
second OLS specifications is the inclusion of brand dummies. In addition to including brand
dummies, all GMM specifications instrument for price and advertising, while GMM (3) and
GMM (4) also account for the endogeneity of product coverage. GMM (1) and GMM (3) use
prices in other cities as instruments while GMM (2) and GMM (4) use lagged prices as
instruments. All models contain time and city/market binary variables (estimated coefficients not
reported).
The only variable that is statistically significant in the constant is the number of common
boundaries in alcohol content-product coverage space (NCBAC). The negative coefficient on
NCBAC shows that brands that share a common boundary with more neighbors in alcohol
content-coverage space have a lower sales share than those with fewer common boundaries. Thus,
the higher number of close neighbors, the greater the competition between brands.
The estimated coefficients for own-price, own-advertising, and their interactions with
product characteristics are reported in the second group in Table 4. Because price and
advertising are highly correlated with their corresponding interactions with product coverage,
the inverse of this latter variable (1 /COV) is used to avoid collinearity. The own-price and own-
advertising coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level and have the
expected signs.
The negative coefficients on the interaction of price and advertising with the inverse of product
coverage indicates that as the coverage of a brand increases, the own-price effect for that brand
decreases (becomes less negative) while the own-advertising effect increases (becomes more
positive). Thus, the sales of brands that are widely sold within a city are less sensitive to a change
in price than are brands that are less widely available. Also, advertising is more effective for
Table 4
Results of demand model estimation
Dependent variable:
sales share (wjt)
OLS (1) OLS (2) GMM (1) GMM (2) GMM (3) GMM (4)
Variable; description Coefficient t-statistic a Coefficient t-statistic a Coefficient b t-statistic b Coefficient b t-statistic b Coefficient b t-statistic b Coefficient b t-statistic b
Constant ajt
Brand dummies no yes yes yes yes yes
NCB: alcohol-coverage
(AC) space c
−4.05 −3.10 −2.93 −2.76 −2.61 −2.23 −2.93 −2.34 −0.73 −0.57 −0.74 −0.58
Own price (b) and own-advertising (c)
logP −119.36 −13.88 −232.19 −14.89 −238.70 −3.23 −286.6 −9.22 −296.29 −3.43 −273.25 −8.97
logP×(1/coverage) −0.88 −4.66 −0.88 −3.48 −1.00 −2.47 −1.00 −2.51 −1.06 −2.54 −0.97 −2.49
logP×NCB: coverage-
size–price space
−7.12 −14.08 −5.66 −13.52 −6.24 −7.09 −6.42 −9.34 −13.72 −7.89 −13.56 −9.72
Aγ 7.08 36.21 1.47 9.51 1.30 4.08 1.30 3.80 3.23 3.82 3.23 3.83
Aγ×(1 /coverage) −0.59 −9.39 −0.23 −6.90 −0.17 −2.22 −0.24 2.66 −0.21 −2.25 −0.21 −2.27
Aγ×NCB: coverage-size
(CS) space
−0.26 −7.60 −0.18 −6.83 −0.16 −3.75 −0.16 −3.60 −0.62 −3.22 −0.62 −3.23
Weighted cross price and weighted cross-advertising terms (λl and τm)
Distance measures for price (weighing matrix acronym)
Alcohol-coverage
space (WAC)
3.32 21.94 5.29 12.72 4.57 5.91 4.92 6.03 3.65 4.05 3.80 4.32
Nearest neighbor:
AC space
(WNNAC)
−4.67 −11.62 3.35 8.85 3.43 5.26 3.19 4.73 5.69 4.72 5.26 4.47
Brewer identity
(WBREW)
5.52 2.76 17.45 5.49 16.41 2.42 17.65 2.45 14.59 1.98 15.78 2.22
Product
classification 2
(WPROD2)
45.65 6.86 76.90 3.65 106.64 2.52 110.00 2.42 128.92 2.88 114.02 2.60
National Identity
(WREG)
38.01 5.25 48.14 6.59 52.68 4.11 57.63 3.54 51.99 3.80 54.67 3.42
Weighted cross price and weighted cross-advertising terms (λl and τm)
Distance measures for advertising (weighing matrix acronym)
Container Size,
(WSIZE)
0.14 7.50 0.02 0.91 0.06 2.07 0.07 2.14 0.10 2.79 0.10 2.88
Common
boundary CSP
space(WCBCSP) d
0.79 17.72 0.57 15.53 0.62 10.65 0.61 10.46 1.37 8.74 1.37 8.72
Nearest neighbor:
CS space
(WNNCS)
0.55 28.12 0.33 19.75 0.39 14.94 0.39 14.11 0.36 10.08 0.37 10.20
Product
Classification 3:
(WPROD3)
−1.31 −8.99 −2.61 −11.33 −3.45 −6.27 −3.56 −5.85 −3.48 −5.56 −3.48 −5.63
National Identity
(WREG)
−1.78 −15.64 0.80 1.63 4.53 1.89 4.63 1.77 4.32 1.68 4.16 1.62
Price index (d )
log(xt /P t
L) 5.36 0.64 12.66 1.95 32.14 0.81 39.36 1.03 37.51 0.59 33.01 0.85
Price instrument No No Other city prices Lagged prices Other city prices Lagged prices
Advertising instrument No No Lagged advert Lagged advert Lagged advert Lagged advert
Coverage instrument No No No No Lagged coverage Lagged coverage
R2 (centered) 0.60 0.76 0.76 (0.66) 0.76 (0.66) 0.75 (0.66) 0.75 (0.65)
J-statistic ( p-value) 1.01 (0.60) 0.83 (0.66) 1.47 (0.48) 1.40 (0.49)
# observations 33,892 33,892 33,892 30,996 30,996 30,996
Coefficients in table are original coefficients ×104. All specifications include time and city dummies (not reported).
a Heteroskedasticity-robust.
b Corrected for heteroskedasticity, and temporal (one lag) and spatial (across cities and across brands) correlation.
c NCB is number of common boundaries.
d CSP is coverage-size-price space.
brands that are more widely sold. Finally, as the number of common boundaries increases the
own-price effect increases (becomes more negative) and the own-advertising effect decreases.
This shows that higher brand competition is associated with more price responsive demand and
less effective advertising.
Comparing the two OLS models, the estimated own-price coefficient is nearly twice as large in
absolute terms when brand dummies are included. Conversely, the own-advertising coefficient
decreased by approximately 80% in model OLS (2) compared to model OLS (1). Instrumentation
of price and advertising in the two GMM models further increases the absolute value of the price
coefficient and decreases the magnitude of the advertising coefficient, albeit at a smaller scale.
This finding is consistent with previous work (Nevo, 2001: Table V) and suggests that a major
portion of the endogeneity bias is accounted by time invariant brand loyalty/valuation. Since the
endogeneity of price, advertising and coverage needs to be accounted for, the remainder of the
discussion focuses on the GMM models.
The estimated coefficients on theweighted cross-price terms are all positive. Thus, brands that are
closer in the alcohol content-product coverage space (both in terms of Euclidean distance and nearest
neighbor), produced by the same brewer, have similar geographic coverage, or belong to the same
product segment are stronger substitutes than other brands. Intuitively, consumers will more likely
switch to a brand located nearby in product space and/or produced by the same brewer than to more
distant brands. Based on the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, the strongest substitution
effects are for brands in the same product segment and with similar geographic coverage.
With the exception of product segment, the estimated coefficients on weighted cross-
advertising terms are positive. This suggests that there are cooperative effects in advertising
across brands that are located more closely in the product space and with the same geographic
coverage. However, the negative coefficient for product segment indicates that there are predatory
cross-advertising effects for brands in the same product segment, thereby potentially offsetting
some of the cooperative effects. The next section contains a more extensive discussion on
cooperative vs. predatory advertising.
The estimated coefficient on real expenditures, log(xt,Pt
L), is not statistically different from
zero. Various specifications were tried that interacted product or market characteristics with real
expenditures, but none of these specifications yields statistically significant coefficients. This
result implies that the brand-level income elasticities are all equal to one.
Overall, all GMM specifications have coefficients of the same magnitude and sign. An
important difference is the magnitude of the price coefficient, which is about 14–24% smaller in
GMM (1) than in the other GMM specifications. The advertising coefficient (Aγ) is 150% larger
when product coverage is treated as an endogenous variable in GMM (3) and GMM (4). The
importance of including advertising in the model was investigated by estimating a version of the
model without advertising. This lead to reductions in the absolute value of the own-price
coefficients of approximately 10%. There were also some differences in the cross-price
coefficients but the overall differences in cross-price elasticities were minimal.
The goodness-of-fit measures are almost identical across all GMM specifications. The over-
identification test suggests that lagged prices (GMM (2) and GMM (4)) might be slightly better
instruments than prices in other cities. Models that used both sets of price instruments were also
considered but their estimates (not shown) are qualitatively similar to using only one set of
instruments.10
10 An over-identification test rejects the validity of instruments when both sets of instruments are included. We suspect
that when the number of over-identifying restrictions is large, the power of this test may be low.
5.2. Exogeneity tests
Two exogeneity tests for the for price instruments were conducted (see Pinske and Slade:
p. 627–628). In one test, the non-suspect instruments are assumed to be prices in other cities and
the suspect instruments are lagged prices. In the second test, the non-suspect instruments are
assumed to be lagged prices and the suspect instruments are prices in other cities. The p-value for
both tests is less than 0.01, suggesting that either set of price instruments is valid.
5.3. Elasticities
The estimated elasticities are consistent across the GMM models: the median own-price
elasticities range from −3.726 to −3.201 while the median own-advertising elasticities range from
0.006 to 0.026. Focusing on model GMM (4), the median own-price elasticity across all brands is
−3.53 and the median own-advertising elasticity is 0.006. All own-price elasticities are negative
while approximately 53% of own-advertising elasticities are positive. All cross-price elasticities are
positive and have amedian value of 0.0527whereas 74% of cross-advertising elasticities are positive
and have a median of 0.010. In general, median own-price elasticities are similar to those reported in
Hausman, Leonard and Zona (−4.98), and Slade (−4.1). Cross-price elasticities are similar to those
in Slade but an order of magnitude smaller than those reported by Hausman, Leonard and Zona.
Tables 5 and 6 contain a sample of the median values of the price and advertising elasticities
for selected brands using GMM (4). To facilitate comparison of the cross-price and cross-
advertising patterns, these tables also contain information on the distance measures used to
compute the elasticities. Table 5 divides brands into light and regular. Brands that are located
closer in product space have, in general, higher cross-elasticities. For example, Budweiser,
Michelob, Coors, Miller Genuine Draft, and Miller High Life are located close to one another in
the product space. The cross-price elasticities between these brands are generally larger than the
cross-price elasticities with Keystone, Old Style, Olympia, Pabst, and all light beers. Estimated
confidence intervals (not shown in Table 5) indicate that all price elasticities are significantly
different than zero at the 5% level.11
The median advertising elasticities vary considerably across brands. Approximately 78% of
the advertising elasticity estimates are statistically different than zero at the 5% level. While all of
the own-advertising elasticities in the table and most of the cross-advertising elasticities are
positive, there are several negative cross-advertising elasticities. These negative cross-advertising
elasticities occur between brands in the same product segment. This is due to the negative
coefficient on the cross-advertising term that is weighted by product segment (Table 3). In these
cases, the predatory cross-advertising effects for brands in the same product segment outweigh the
positive advertising cooperative effects from closely located brands. In general, positive and
negative cross-advertising elasticities have the same order of magnitude, but there are more
positive cross-advertising elasticities than negative cross-advertising elasticities (74% vs. 26%),
indicating that cooperative effects appear to dominate predatory effects. This pattern is present
when either set of GMM estimates in Table 3 is used to compute elasticities, suggesting that
cooperative advertising is robust to either identification assumption. Moreover, this result is also
obtained with OLS (2) estimates and, to a lesser extent, with OLS (1) estimates.
11 5000 random draws are taken from the estimated variance–covariance matrix of the model parameters, which are
assumed to be distributed jointly normal. 95% intervals were computed using the sample of elasticities that result from all
draws.
Table 5
Median price elasticities
Alcohol
(ALC)
4.9 5 5 4.8 5 4.8 5 5 5 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.5 4.5
Coverage
(COV)
0.96 0.94 0.93 0.72 0.54 0.59 0.72 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.82 0.92 0.95 0.76 0.52 0.87 0.95
Brewer Beer Bud Michb Coors Kstone Old
Style
Olymp Pabst MGD High
Life
Bud
Light
Busch
Light
Michb
Light
Coors
Light
Kstone
Light
Old St
Light
MGD
Light
Miller
Lite
Anheuser–Busch BUDWEISER −1.165 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003
MICHELOB 0.055 −2.698 0.060 0.043 0.028 0.041 0.052 0.066 0.072 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.023 0.024 0.011 0.029 0.025
Adolph Coors COORS 0.038 0.051 −2.412 0.064 0.033 0.035 0.043 0.059 0.063 0.020 0.026 0.020 0.046 0.046 0.013 0.029 0.022
KEYSTONE 0.134 0.126 0.197 −6.188 0.103 0.151 0.128 0.125 0.129 0.073 0.081 0.076 0.146 0.147 0.040 0.089 0.082
Bond OLD STYLE 0.242 0.245 0.242 0.283 −16.13 0.290 0.281 0.256 0.256 0.104 0.120 0.110 0.095 0.112 0.377 0.095 0.119
Pabst OLYMPIA 0.092 0.088 0.085 0.123 0.081 −5.169 0.167 0.088 0.097 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.041 0.052 0.058
PABST 0.075 0.092 0.092 0.073 0.033 0.142 −4.144 0.091 0.101 0.041 0.040 0.043 0.042 0.040 0.011 0.040 0.045
Philip Morris/Miller MGD 0.024 0.034 0.034 0.021 0.017 0.019 0.028 −1.887 0.050 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.006 0.021 0.025
HIGH LIFE 0.031 0.041 0.041 0.023 0.015 0.021 0.030 0.054 −1.921 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.005 0.027 0.026
Anheuser–Busch BUD LT 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 −1.374 0.029 0.035 0.036 0.028 0.018 0.023 0.029
BUSCH LT 0.025 0.024 0.017 0.018 0.006 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.099 −2.237 0.098 0.098 0.102 0.055 0.073 0.079
MICHB LT 0.040 0.039 0.026 0.027 0.012 0.033 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.172 0.124 −2.782 0.166 0.141 0.104 0.144 0.142
Adolph Coors COORS LT 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.037 0.033 0.035 −1.394 0.036 0.036 0.025 0.030
KEYST LT 0.043 0.042 0.088 0.090 0.020 0.042 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.241 0.242 0.244 0.300 −4.082 0.141 0.184 0.195
Bond O.STYLE LT 0.113 0.108 0.107 0.134 0.945 0.133 0.108 0.107 0.107 0.966 0.941 0.963 0.974 1.080 −17.936 0.598 0.953
Philip Morris/Miller MGD LT 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.009 0.017 0.016 0.028 0.028 0.064 0.070 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.052 −2.043 0.097
MILLER LT 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.014 0.030 −1.294
Table 6
Median advertising elasticities
Coverage
(COV)
0.96 0.95 0.82 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.72 0.76 0.54 0.52 0.59 0.72 0.95 0.87 0.95 0.95
Size 0.41 0.42 0.47 0.29 0.29 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.48 0.46 0.43 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.43
Brewer Beer Bud Bud
Light
Busch
Light
Michb Michb
Light
Coors Coors
Light
Kstone Kstone
Light
Old
Style
Old St
Light
Olymp Pabst MGD MGD
Light
High
Life
Miller
Lite
Anheuser–
Busch
BUDWEISER 0.0174 0.0099 0.0004 −0.0005 0.0015 −0.0004 0.0104 0.0033 0.0032 −0.0006 0.0002 0.0001 0.0016 −0.0003 0.0055 −0.0006 0.0126
BUD LT 0.0309 0.0323 −0.0008 0.0044 −0.0038 0.0074 −0.0153 0.0075 −0.0072 0.0003 −0.0026 0.0002 0.0034 0.0070 −0.0080 0.0115 −0.0107
BUSCH LT 0.0716 −0.0493 0.0037 0.0090 −0.0092 0.0134 −0.0538 0.0275 −0.0174 0.0012 −0.0064 0.0005 0.0114 0.0266 −0.0272 0.0275 −0.0552
MICHELOB −0.0187 0.0664 0.0045 0.0517 0.0314 −0.0055 0.0698 0.0342 0.0304 −0.0053 0.0018 0.0011 0.0148 −0.0031 0.0668 −0.0071 0.0827
MICHELOB LT 0.0954 −0.0946 −0.0049 0.0556 0.0312 0.0315 −0.0971 0.0376 −0.0338 0.0013 −0.0157 0.0013 0.0141 0.0404 −0.0520 0.0562 −0.1059
Adolph
Coors
COORS −0.0135 0.0668 0.0045 −0.0038 0.0103 0.0262 0.0896 0.0318 0.0261 −0.0059 0.0021 0.0008 0.0105 −0.0031 0.0567 −0.0042 0.0929
COORS LT 0.0285 −0.0150 −0.0009 0.0045 −0.0037 0.0088 0.0349 0.0077 −0.0075 0.0004 −0.0046 0.0002 0.0034 0.0072 −0.0088 0.0115 −0.0144
KEYSTONE 0.2910 0.2289 0.0166 0.0408 0.0328 0.0699 0.2639 0.1025 0.1685 0.0072 0.0086 −0.0006 −0.0120 0.1141 0.1716 0.1166 0.2924
KEYSTONE LT 0.1748 −0.1355 −0.0047 0.0242 −0.0192 0.0362 −0.1513 0.1088 0.0512 0.0034 −0.0206 0.0017 0.0264 0.0693 −0.0622 0.0640 −0.1656
Bond OLD STYLE −0.7749 0.1536 0.0149 −0.2031 0.0309 −0.2219 0.1561 0.1305 0.1021 0.0056 0.1171 0.0031 0.0235 −0.1761 0.0817 −0.3778 0.1635
O. STYLE LT 0.2041 −1.2974 −0.0592 0.0586 −0.2398 0.0640 −1.3269 0.1259 −0.4294 0.2210 0.0128 0.0052 0.0304 0.0533 −0.4297 0.0938 −1.4628
Pabst OLYMPIA 0.2107 0.1731 0.0128 0.0465 0.0279 0.0642 0.1899 −0.0143 0.0903 0.0063 0.0177 0.0012 −0.0036 0.0678 0.1022 0.1022 0.2141
PABST 0.1646 0.1343 0.0090 0.0446 0.0269 0.0542 0.1566 −0.0164 0.0525 0.0019 0.0021 −0.0002 0.0164 0.0554 0.0763 0.0853 0.1817
Philip
Morris/
Miller
MGD −0.0070 0.0418 0.0020 −0.0009 0.0089 −0.0018 0.0458 0.0162 0.0148 −0.0029 0.0010 0.0004 0.0070 0.0226 0.0307 −0.0014 0.0540
MGD LT 0.0677 −0.0415 −0.0017 0.0098 −0.0051 0.0095 −0.0442 0.0212 −0.0166 0.0014 −0.0070 0.0004 0.0113 0.0472 0.0401 0.0305 −0.0499
HIGH LIFE −0.0070 0.0520 0.0024 −0.0018 0.0087 −0.0019 0.0516 0.0183 0.0164 −0.0026 0.0010 0.0006 0.0083 −0.0009 0.0426 0.0394 0.0707
MILLER LITE 0.0258 −0.0055 −0.0006 0.0038 −0.0029 0.0062 −0.0087 0.0059 −0.0053 0.0002 −0.0019 0.0002 0.0027 0.0066 −0.0066 0.0113 0.0288
6. Summary and discussion
Much of the previous research on U.S. brewing has utilized firm-level data or data for a limited
number of brands. The results of this previous research has been mixed regarding the nature of
advertising rivalry among firms or brands with some results indicating cooperative and some
indicating predatory behavior (Nelson, 2005: 281–288). Using a more complete set of brands, our
results indicate that, in general, advertising is cooperative in the U.S. brewing industry. However,
advertising rivalry does exist within the light beer product segment, as evidenced by the existence of
negative cross-advertising elasticities. Thus, the earliermixed results on advertising rivalrymay have
been due to focusing on inter-firm rivalry rather than on inter-brand rivalry with product segments.
In other markets, advertising has been found to be mainly predatory. Seldon and Doroodian
(1990) find that firm advertising in the cigarette industry is “purely” predatory (i.e. own-
advertising increases own-sales and decreases rivals' sales, but overall sales remain constant).
Slade (1995) finds that advertising among 4 saltine crackers is “mildly” predatory (i.e. own-
advertising increases own-sales and decreases rivals' sales, but overall sales increase). Our,
results, on the other hand, indicate that both types of advertising can coexist in a market.
The generally cooperative nature of traditional advertising suggests it stimulates the overall
demand for beer. This is contrary to earlier literature that advertising does not stimulate the
demand for beer (Nelson, 1999; Nelson and Moran, 1995; Lee and Tremblay, 1992; and
references cited therein). This argument was used by the Federal Trade Commission in a case that
dealt with a petition from the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) in 1983 to ban
broadcast advertising of alcohol (including beer) (Center for Science in the Public Interest, 1983).
The FTC dismissed the petition on the grounds that advertising does not increase the consumption
of alcoholic beverages.
The results in this paper can also be utilized to test alternative hypotheses of brand pricing
behavior and market power (Rojas, in press). The rising concentration in the U.S. brewing
industry, where the sales of the top three brewers account for more than 90% of domestic
consumption, and the emergence of Anheuser–Busch as the sole industry leader raise concerns
about deviations from competitive behavior (Tremblay and Tremblay: 283). Also, policy issues
that relate alcohol consumption with health and taxes can be analyzed in more detail with brand
level elasticity estimates.
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